Bloomberg points out that Brazil overtook the USA as the main supplier of corn to China, with shipments reaching 8.79 million tons in the first nine months of 2023, which represents more than 40% of the Asian country’s imports. On the other hand, US cargo totaled 6.5 million tons, that is, 30% of the total, which represents a drop of more than 50% compared to 2022.
Something similar happened with soybean imports, which totaled 89.63 million tons in the first 11 months of 2023, which is equivalent to an increase of 13.3% compared to the same period of the previous year.
It is important to note that Brazilian soybean exports to China reached a record 64.97 million tons (+25% compared to 2022), while US sales reached 20.36 million tons, i.e. a drop 8% compared to the previous year.
These numbers clearly show the growing competitiveness/productivity of Brazilian agriculture, and also the fact that last year Brazil had the largest grain harvest in its history, at 328 million tons, an absolute record.
There is a third factor in this dazzling equation of Brazilian agribusiness: the Chinese government’s strategic decision to turn to Brazil with the aim of reducing dependence on the USA, especially with regard to soybeans and corn.
In this context, the statements made by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs made on November 21st of last year acquire enormous importance for Argentina’s interests.
The Ministry warned that it would be “…a major mistake in President-elect Javier Milei’s foreign policy to break relations with larger countries such as China or Brazil”.
Spokeswoman Mao Ning in Beijing added: “No country can develop economically and intensify its trade cooperation without political/diplomatic relations.”
China’s diplomatic language is exercised with unequivocal clarity, and always with a tone that is highly respectful of the sovereignty of the interlocutor country, applying a principle arising from its 5,000 years of history founded on the belief that the fundamental element in the relationship between two countries is trust mutual, not in a psychological sense, but in a strategic sense.
Finally, Mao Ning recalled that “China values its relations with Argentina from a strategic and long-term point of view, and is broadly willing to deepen friendship between the two countries, as well as contribute to the development of the other. and for common prosperity”.
For Argentina, the most practical thing is to imitate China and assume, in relation to the second economy in the world, a long-term strategic vision based on national interest.
International politics is a world of realities, not ideologies, and reality always prevails, which means it is also always right.
China is the second largest global economy after the USA, and also the main trading partner of 144 countries in the world, out of the 192 represented in the United Nations. Therefore, in the last decade, its contribution to the growth of the international economy was 38.6% per year.
Argentina’s strategic relevance to China in a long-term vision was demonstrated by the fact that the “swap” that the Central Bank of Beijing maintains with the Central Bank of the Argentine Republic is the only one among the more than 40 signed by the BCRA that allows it to use the 19 billion dollar swap credit not only to finance bilateral trade, but also to pay what Argentina owes to the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
Therefore, China became the last payer of Argentina’s international debt. Without this, “default” would be inevitable.
This indicates the strategic relevance that, in a long-term vision, Argentina has for China, which always acts under the premise of the decisive importance of its national interest.
In this sense, Argentina should also imitate China and be guided exclusively by its national interest, especially in agri-food issues.